“I’m just a patsy.” Lee Harvey Oswald, November 1963
Speaking of Guy Fawkes and his confreres, Father Gerard comments that “many intelligent men took for granted that in some way or other the actual conspirators were but the dupes and instruments of more crafty men than themselves, and in their mad enterprise played the game of ministers of State.” (Gerard 43) In this sense, Guy Fawkes may represent the archetype of the category of person known in modern intelligence parlance as the patsy.
The real authorship of state sponsored terrorism is to be successfully concealed, then a collection of scapegoats is the first ingredient required. These may be defined as the patsies, or alternatively as fall-guys, scapegoats, useful idiots, or dupes. It is necessary that they be of low mental ability and great gullibility, since their mission is to be part of false-flag groups which pretend to be working for a cause, such as the restoration of the caliphate, while in reality they are under the control of a private network inside the US government. It is vital for the terrorist controllers that the patsies not realize that this or that comrade in arms is actually a double agent, a provocateur working for the parallel CIA or some other complicit agency, or which more will be said later. The best candidates for the patsy role are psychotics, psychopaths, or sociopaths. They may be fanatics bursting with criminal energy and criminal intent, or they may be pathetic ideologues and naifs. Frequently they are also misfits, bunglers, and generally maladroit in what they undertake.
According to research sponsored in 1999 by the Library of Congress, in a 1972 study “psychologist B.J. Berkowitz described six psychological types who would be most likely to threaten or try to use WMD: paranoids, paranoid schizophrenics, borderline mental defectives, schizophrenic types, passive-aggressive personality types, and sociopath personalities. He considered sociopaths the most likely actually to use WMD. Nuclear terrorism expert Jessica Stern disagreed. She believed that "Schizophrenics and sociopaths, for example, may want to commit acts of mass destruction, but they are less likely than others to succeed." She pointed out that large-scale dissemination of chemical, biological, or radiological agents requires a group effort, but that "Schizophrenics, in particular, often have difficulty functioning in groups ...." (Hudson)
Because the patsies are usually such low-grade subjects, they require comprehensive support of many types. They may need help in renting an apartment or in finding a cover job. They always seem to be getting in trouble with the police, and then it is necessary to see that they get out on bail as quickly as possible. If they are lonely, they may need specially trained sex operatives to comfort them or even to marry them (the KGB and the Stasi called their sex troops “The Swallows”). Above all they require constant financial assistance to be able to travel around the world, as they so frequently seem to be able to do despite the fact that they are most often without any visible means of support. The most important things about patsies are that they are almost always physically, mentally and technically unable to carry out the crimes of which they are accused. This is a matter of insufficient ability and capability, and not of the lack of criminal intent, which is often abundant.
Patsies can then be used in many combinations. They can be merged together in false flag terror operations. These organizations will assume a distinct ideological or religious coloration and will advertise it, and that will become the key to the process of creating or reinforcing the enemy image desired by the terrorist controllers after the terrorist action has been successfully carried out. That coloration or affiliation will constitute the false flag, and it will be assiduously prepared. Here some of the members may be witting; these are the double agents and police informers. Other components are not witting, at least about the most important things. What patsies can accomplish by themselves is often supplemented by the actions of doubles, double agents, and informers, who do things for them when they can not show up. Sometimes patsies are sent to make contact with other groups, a process known as sheep-dipping. If a terrorist controller wants to implicate the Podunk Democratic Party in terrorism, then he sends a patsy to sign up with them and attend their meetings before the terrorist act is carried out. That gives the police a good reason to raid the Podunk Democratic Party headquarters.
Thus, in 1992 and 1993, the New York City FBI informant and agent provocateur Emad Salem repeatedly tried to implicate the Sudanese UN Mission in his own "Islamic terror cell" World Trade Center bomb plot conspiracy. Here we see how a false flag terror cell sheep-dips its dupes into contact with a target, which then becomes the object of police investigation, and possibly later of military attack.
In January 2002, the Supreme Court of Germany had to call off all proceedings in the ongoing constitutional trial concerning the Schroeder government’s attempt to ban the extreme right-wing or reputedly neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany because it turned out that the government's chief witness, a member of the national NPD party executive, had worked as an informant for the German Constitutional Protection Agency (Verfassungsschutz, comparable to the FBI), for many years. The Court ruled that the trial could not go forward until this issue was clarified.
Osama Bin Laden, the rich misfit, has often been described in terms which seem to suit him for this category. A CIA agent named Beardman has asserted that Osama Bin Laden, during the entire time that he was organizing his mujaheddin fighters to do battle with the Soviets in Afghanistan, never realized that the operation was being financed and directed by the CIA. The CIA's Beardman confirmed, in this regard, that Osama Bin Laden was not aware of the role he was playing on behalf of Washington. In the words of Bin Laden (quoted by Beardman): "neither I, nor my brothers saw evidence of American help." Bin Laden thus may also qualify as a clueless dupe.
The patsies ultimately have three vital functions. The first is that they have to be noticed. They must attract lots and lots of attention. They may issue raving statements on videotape, or doubles can be used to issue these statements for them if they are not up to it. They need to get into fights with passersby, as Mohammed Atta is said to have done concerning a parking space at the airport in Maine early in the morning on September 11. Even if they are presumed dead they must remain prominent, as in the case of Atta’s passport, which is alleged by the FBI to have survived the fiery collapse of the World Trade Center towers to be found undamaged and unsinged on a nearby street. Even when presumed dead they must be eloquent about themselves and their activities, as they accused 9/11 hijackers when they left behind a copy of the Koran, airline schedules, terrorist literature and videotapes, and Atta’s crudely forged last will and testament in a car and in luggage.
Despite the need to be noticed as much as possible, the patsies have to stay out of jail. If they are all in jail, the planned terror action cannot take place. This is not because the patsies are needed to carry it out, but rather because they must be on hand in order to be blamed for it, whether they are on the scene or far away. If the patsies are in jail, they cannot be scapegoated. Therefore a lawyer and bail money must be provided, or a complicit judge told to release the defendant. Immigration authorities and Customs must be told to look the other way. To keep the patsies out of jail so they can serve their vital purpose is the job of the moles, as will soon be shown.
Finally, if all else goes well, it is the destiny of the patsies to take the blame for the terror action once it has happened. At this point the moles in the government apparatus, who had earlier been the patsies’ greatest friends and protectors, become their most implacable enemies. The patsies must be hunted down and, preferably, liquidated on the spot, as the British Special Air Services anti-terrorist force always prefers to do, with a maximum of firepower. Their faces and stories will be demonized as the latest manifestation of absolute evil. The nationality, philosophy, or religion which the media portray them as representing will become the target of raving vilification, arrest, economic sanctions, cruise missile retaliation, and armed invasion, as the case may be.
A pathetic case in point is Richard Reid, the shoe bomber of December 2001. Shortly after Reid was arrested for having attempted to blow up the transatlantic airliner in which he was traveling with the help of explosives planted in the soles of his shoes, sources in the Washington DC mosque said that they had acquired the following profile of Reid from Dr. Abdul Haqq Baker of Brixton mosque in London. According to Baker and others from Brixton, Richard Reid could only be described as mentally deficient. "He was not someone who would be medically classified as mentally retarded," the source reported, "but he was definitely slow." He could not have hatched any kind of terror attack on his own, and could not have even put the shoe bombs on his own feet without help, the source had been told by officials of the Brixton Mosque. Yet, according to news accounts, Reid spent time in Iran three or four years before his terror attempt, and traveled to Tel Aviv from Heathrow Airport near London in the summer of 2001. He was thoroughly frisked before being allowed on to the El Al flight, and was forced to sit next to a sky marshal at the back of the plane. Israeli officials claimed to know nothing about what Reid was doing in Israel. From Israel, Reid went to Egypt, and then to Turkey, before returning to London Heathrow. Reid had been sleeping on the floor at the Brixton Mosque, had no visible means of support, etc. Reid's father, who was also a convert to Islam, and encouraged his son to do the same, told the American press that his son must have been brainwashed by radical Islamists to get him to undertake the suicide attack. (New York Times and Washington Post, December 29, 2001)
Another case may well be that of Jose Padilla, the man who was arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare airport, and who has been designated as an enemy combatant by Attorney General Ashcroft and held incommunicado without charges or a lawyer for months. Although he may only be a walk-on in Ashcroft’s larger spectacle, what kind of an Islamic fighter was Padilla supposed to be? According to Maureen Dowd, this “plotter was a Chicago street punk named Jose Padilla, a hothead with a long criminal record who was thrown in jail in Florida for shooting at a motorist in a road-rage incident. The mind games of fear begin with Abu Zubaydah, the U.S. captive, one of Osama bin Laden's top lieutenants, who fingered Padilla.” (New York Times, June 12, 2002)
The most famous patsy is of course Lee Harvey Oswald, the archetype of the embittered, lonely misfit and drifter. But he was a misfit with a difference, one who was able to move from the Marine Corps to émigré status in the USSR, then back to Texas and New Orleans as an activist for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Oswald was someone who seemed to go out of his way to be abrasive and to attract attention. He handed out leaflets for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and got involved in altercations with anti-Castro Cubans. He appeared in a radio debate, and was interviewed on television. He took a surprise trip to Mexico City to visit the Soviet Embassy there. He did everything possible to get noticed. Indeed, he got noticed so much that at various time there may have been two or even three Oswald doubles running around, something that would have required the resources of a major intelligence organization like the CIA or the FBI. But Oswald was also unable to manage the petty details of his own everyday life without the assistance of others, notably of the European aristocrat Georges de Morenschildt, a patrician who had George H.W. Bush’s name and phone number in his address book. Oswald was most likely an FBI informant, working for Special Agent Guy Bannister in New Orleans. But this did not protect him from being fingered as the assassin, nor did it save him from being silenced by Jack Ruby before he could ever testify in his own defense. The problem with Oswald, as with so many patsies, is that he was neither physically nor technically capable of carrying out the crime which has been ascribed to him: using his antiquated Italian 1917 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle with its crude little telescopic sight, it is clear that Oswald could never have fired with sufficient speed and accuracy the four or five shots (at minimum) that were actually heard on Dealey Plaza that day, and which are necessary to account for the number of wounds suffered by President Kennedy and Governor Connally, plus other shots that missed their target. This question of physical impossibility is often the most obvious weak point of the official explanations of terrorist actions. In the Kennedy assassination, it was expressly to address the problem of the physical impossibility of Oswald’s having acted as a lone assassin that Arlen Spector, part of the staff of the Warren Commission, invented his magic bullet theory. Spector asserted that the same slug had caused seven wounds: an entry wound in Kennedy’s back, an exit wound at the base of his throat, then an entry wound in Connally’s back, an exit wound in Connally’s chest, an entry wound in Connally’s wrist, and exit wound from the other side of Connally’s wrist, and finally an entry wound in Connally’s leg. At the end of all this, the bullet was supposedly found in virtually pristine condition lying in a stretcher at Parkland Hospital after Kennedy had died. Even after these incredible contortions, requiring that the same bullet change course in mid-air at least twice, the problem of physical impossibility had not been solved, since there were still four or five shots on the audio tape which had recorded the sounds of the assassination through the open microphone of a Dallas police officer’s radio. It was this insuperable problem which led the House Assassinations Committee of 1978 to rule that Kennedy’s death was the result of a probable conspiracy, and not simply of the actions of a deranged lone assassin.
As Sanguinetti sums up, “the outrages that are accomplished directly by the intelligence agencies and secret services of the State are not usually claimed by anybody, but are each time imputed or attributed to some convenient ‘culprit,’ like Pinelli or Valpreda. Experience has proved that this is the weakest point of such terrorism, and that which determines the extreme fragility of it in the political usage that certain forces want to make of it. It is starting from the results of the same experience that the strategists of secret services of the State seek, from this point on, to lend a greater credibility, or at least a lesser inverisimilitude to their own work …by claiming them directly through such-and-such initials of a ghostly group….” (Sanguinetti 2)
You give yourself for an agent provocateur. The proper business of an agent provocateur is to provoke. Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent (1907).
The patsies inhabit a scene of their own, a place on the outskirts of society where terrorists, naïve or romantic dupes, provocateurs, sting operatives, double agents, Dopplegänger and informers congregate. There was something of this nature among southern European fascist extremists in Madrid, Athens, and Rome during the 1960s and 1970s; the denizens of this milieu played their parts in the “black terrorism” of those years. There was a parallel milieu of anarchists, Maoists, left communists, Trotskyists, and anarchosyndicalists in many cities of Europe during that same time frame. In the 1980s and 1990s, a patsy milieu developed among right-wing militia activists and paramilitaries in the great plains and upper Midwest of America. During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, a patsy milieu has grown up not just in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia, but also in western Europe and the United States. In fact, the classic patsy milieu of the 1990s was in London.
The patsy milieu has been skillfully evoked by Joseph Conrad in his fascinating novel, The Secret Agent (1907). Here we have the agent provocateur Verloc meeting with his confreres of the International Red Committee; Verloc is in the pay of the Russian Embassy, among others, and attempts to organize a bombing of the prime meridian at Greenwich Observatory. The Russian Embassy wants the attentat in order to motivate the international Milan conference to crack down on nihilists, revolutionaries, and bomb- throwers all over Europe. A movie which accurately depicts the world of patsies, moles, and expert professionals is The Package, written by John Bishop, starring Gene Hackman and Tommy Lee Jones. During the Gorbachev era, a group of US and Soviet generals opposed to disarmament decide to sabotage an upcoming treaty by assassinating Gorbachev during a visit to Chicago. Tommy Lee Jones is the expert professional who operates in complete anonymity – he is smuggled into the US under a fake identity. There is also a pathetic patsy, recruited by one of the mole generals from a military prison and sent to Chicago to attract attention as a neo-Nazi.
…jokes were actually made that the key FBIHQ personnel had to be spies or moles, like Robert Hanssen, who were actually working for Osama Bin Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis' effort. Colleen Rowley to FBI Director Robert Mueller
As has already been suggested, the patsies are incapable of operating on their own for any length of time, and certainly do not have the ability to carry out the vast crimes that are attributed to them. The assistance which the patsies require in order to carry out their roles come from another sub- system, of the terrorist enterprise, the moles. The most important category of moles is constituted by high-level government officials and managers who are not loyal to the agencies they work for, and certainly not to the Constitution they are sworn to serve, but rather operate as members of a private network which has infiltrated the government and ensconced itself in it, sometimes over a very long time. In fact, the US government as it exists today is the result of many generations of penetration by moles, with the moles of each generation assisting the careers of the succeeding generation, and so forth, until loyalty to the Constitution is the exception rather than the rule.
Foreign moles have been able successfully to operate inside the US government for long periods. Aldrich Ames worked as a mole for the Soviets inside the CIA for many years. The same goes for Soviet mole Robert Hanssen of the FBI, who was discovered in the spring of 2000. In 1997 the press carried a news item about an Israeli mole code-named Mega, allegedly controlled by Danny Yatom, head of the Mossad, who was allegedly ensconced in the Clinton White House. (Washington Post, May 7, 1997) But here we are not primarily concerned with outright foreign moles, but rather with moles whose loyalty goes to networks based on religion, finance, or other associations based primarily in the US, although here foreign influence certainly cannot be ruled out. Even so, the fact that high-level moles were able to operate for so long suggests a certain nonchalance about the presence of moles in the US government bureaucracy; certainly a mole working for a US-based subversive network would have an easier time in operating than one working for the USSR.
So far, the classic mole suspect of 9/11 according to most published accounts is Dave Frasca, the head of the radical Islamic fundamentalist bureau of the FBI, the point at which the Phoenix memorandum and the Minnesota requests to search Zacharias Moussawi’s laptop evidently converged, only to be ignored, sabotaged, and sanctioned. As Time magazine commented:
…in its most searching passage, Rowley's letter lays out the case that the FBI made fateful miscalculations by failing to see a possible connection between the Minneapolis investigation of flight student Moussaoui and the hunch of Phoenix agent Kenneth Williams — posited in a report to HQ two months earlier — that al-Qaeda operatives were attending U.S. flight schools. Law-enforcement and congressional sources told Time that both reports landed on the desk of Dave Frasca, the head of the FBI's radical- fundamentalist unit. The Phoenix memo was buried; the Moussaoui warrant request was denied. (Time, May 27, 2002)
Other accounts differ as to the identity of the main blocker of the Phoenix memorandum and the Minneapolis proposals. According to former CIA agent Ray McGovern, the official who sat on this material was Spike Owen, who nevertheless “received a $20,000 cash award from the administration for his duties in safeguarding the American people.” (Washington Post, July 26, 2004) Was this a mole?
The Phoenix memorandum, written by Kenneth Williams, an agent in Phoenix, was sent to FBI headquarters as an electronic computer message on July 10. It was reviewed by midlevel supervisors, who headed the bureau’s Bin Laden and Islamic extremist counterterrorism units. The Phoenix memorandum urged FBI headquarters to investigate Middle Eastern men enrolled in American flight schools, and cited Bin Laden by name, and suggested that the men might be training for terror operations against the United States. (New York Times, May 15, 2002)
Frasca is not mentioned once in the final report of the Kean-Hamilton commission, and whistle- blower Colleen Rowley, despite having been featured on the cover of Time as person of the year, never testified in public, and gets only one fleeting mention of her interview with the 9/11 commission in footnote 94, page 557, towards the back of the book.
Rowley’s memo to FBI Director Mueller has been published, and is worth examining at length. The Supervisory Special Agent to whom she repeatedly refers is once again presumably David Frasca. Rowley reports:
The Minneapolis agents who responded to the call about Moussaoui's flight training identified him as a terrorist threat from a very early point. The decision to take him into custody on August 15, 2001, on the INS "overstay" charge was a deliberate one to counter that threat and was based on the agents' reasonable suspicions. While it can be said that Moussaoui's overstay status was fortuitous, because it allowed for him to be taken into immediate custody and prevented him from receiving any more flight training, it was certainly not something the INS coincidentally undertook of their own volition. I base this on the conversation I had when the agents called me at home late on the evening Moussaoui was taken into custody to confer and ask for legal advice about their next course of action. The INS agent was assigned to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and was therefore working in tandem with FBI agents. To say then, as has been iterated numerous times, that probable cause did not exist until after the disastrous event occurred, is really to acknowledge that the missing piece of probable cause was only the FBI's (FBIHQ's) failure to appreciate that such an event could occur.
Even without knowledge of the Phoenix communication (and any number of other additional intelligence communications that FBIHQ personnel were privy to in their central coordination roles), the Minneapolis agents appreciated the risk. So I think it's very hard for the FBI to offer the "20- 20 hindsight" justification for its failure to act! Also intertwined with my reluctance in this case to accept the "20-20 hindsight" rationale is first- hand knowledge that I have of statements made on September 11th, after the first attacks on the World Trade Center had already occurred, made telephonically by the FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) who was the one most involved in the Moussaoui matter and who, up to that point, seemed to have been consistently, almost deliberately thwarting the Minneapolis FBI agents' efforts…. Even after the attacks had begun, the SSA in question was still attempting to block the search of Moussaoui's computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere coincidence with Minneapolis' prior suspicions about Moussaoui.
The fact is that key FBIHQ personnel whose job it was to assist and coordinate with field division agents on terrorism investigations and the obtaining and use of FISA searches (and who theoretically were privy to many more sources of intelligence information than field division agents), continued to, almost inexplicably, throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis' by-now desperate efforts to obtain a FISA search warrant, long after the French intelligence service provided its information and probable cause became clear. HQ personnel brought up almost ridiculous questions in their apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause. In all of their conversations and correspondence, HQ personnel never disclosed to the Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had, only approximately three weeks earlier, warned of Al Qaeda operatives in flight schools seeking flight training for terrorist purposes! Nor did FBIHQ personnel do much to disseminate the information about Moussaoui to other appropriate intelligence/law enforcement authorities. When, in a desperate 11th hour measure to bypass the FBIHQ roadblock, the Minneapolis Division undertook to directly notify the CIA's Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), FBIHQ personnel actually chastised the Minneapolis agents for making the direct notification without their approval!
Eventually on August 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA deliberately further undercut the FISA effort by not adding the further intelligence information which he had promised to add that supported Moussaoui's foreign power connection and making several changes in the wording of the information that had been provided by the Minneapolis Agent, the Minneapolis agents were notified that the NSLU Unit Chief did not think there was sufficient evidence of Moussaoui's connection to a foreign power. Minneapolis personnel are, to this date, unaware of the specifics of the verbal presentations by the FBIHQ SSA to NSLU or whether anyone in NSLU ever was afforded the opportunity to actually read for him/herself all of the information on Moussaoui that had been gathered by the Minneapolis Division and the French intelligence service. Obviously verbal presentations are far more susceptible to mis- characterization and error. The e-mail communications between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, however, speak for themselves and there are far better witnesses than me who can provide their first hand knowledge of these events characterized in one Minneapolis agent's e-mail as FBIHQ is "setting this up for failure." My only comment is that the process of allowing the FBI supervisors to make changes in affidavits is itself fundamentally wrong, just as, in the follow-up to FBI Laboratory Whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst's allegations, this process was revealed to be wrong in the context of writing up laboratory results. With the Whitehurst allegations, this process of allowing supervisors to re-write portions of laboratory reports, was found to provide opportunities for over-zealous supervisors to skew the results in favor of the prosecution. In the Moussaoui case, it was the opposite -- the process allowed the Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the significance of the information thus far collected in order to get out of the work of having to see the FISA application through or possibly to avoid taking what he may have perceived as an unnecessary career risk. I understand that the failures of the FBIHQ personnel involved in the Moussa matter are also being officially excused because they were too busy with other investigations, the Cole bombing and other important terrorism matters, but the Supervisor's taking of the time to read each word of the information submitted by Minneapolis and then substitute his own choice of wording belies to some extent the notion that he was too busy.
To sum up her frustration, Rowley wrote: “I know I shouldn’t be flippant about this, but jokes were actually made that the key FBIHQ personnel had to be spies or moles, like Robert Hansen [sic], who were actually working for Osama Bin Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis’ effort.” These lines speak for themselves. Evidently Frasca was not alone, since he was able to stay on the job with impunity even after 9/11, and even received a promotion. Rowley stresses the lack of any accountability whatsoever in the FBI’s internal process, which seems to be made to order for facilitating the unhampered operations of moles.
Although the last thing the FBI or the country needs now is a witch hunt, I do find it odd that (to my knowledge) no inquiry whatsoever was launched of the relevant FBIHQ personnel's actions a long time ago. Despite FBI leaders' full knowledge of all the items mentioned herein (and probably more that I'm unaware of), the SSA, his unit chief, and other involved HQ personnel were allowed to stay in their positions and, what's worse, occupy critical positions in the FBI's SIOC Command Center post September 11th. (The SSA in question actually received a promotion some months afterward!) It's true we all make mistakes and I'm not suggesting that HQ personnel in question ought to be burned at the stake, but, we all need to be held accountable for serious mistakes. (Time, May 27, 2002)
An internal FBI memo, which became public in May 2002, revealed that FBI agents had destroyed evidence gathered in an investigation involving Osama bin Laden's network after its e-mail wiretap system mistakenly captured information to which the agency was not entitled. This was supposedly because the FBI software being used, called Carnivore, not only picked up the e-mails of its target, ''but also picked up e-mails on non-covered targets,'' said the memo, which was written in March 2000 to agency headquarters in Washington. According to the memo, “The FBI technical person was apparently so upset that he destroyed all the e-mail take, including the take on'' the suspect. These events allegedly took place during an investigation in Denver in which the FBI's bin Laden unit was using the bureau's Carnivore system to conduct electronic surveillance of a suspect under a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrant. The memo was addressed to M.E. ''Spike'' Bowman, the FBI's associate general counsel for national security. Another mole?
The Justice Department's Office of Intelligence and Policy Review claimed to be furious after learning the evidence captured by the e-mail wiretap system was destroyed because of the glitch, the memo states. “To state that she was unhappy at ITOS (International Terrorism Operations Center) and the UBL (bin Laden) unit is an understatement,'' the memo stated, quoting a Justice official. This incident came to light in the course of a court battle over whether the Carnivore system was being used illegally by the FBI to scoop up emails that were not covered by a warrant. The main reform undertaken by the FBI in this matter would appear to have been to change the name of Carnivore to DCS- 1000. (D. Ian Hopper, “Memo: FBI Destroyed Evidence in Bin Laden Case After Glitch With E-mail Surveillance System,” Associated Press, Boston Globe, May 28, 2002)
Then there is the case of Kevin Delaney, an official of the Federal Aviation Administration. During the day of 9/11, supervisors had asked air traffic controllers and other officials to talk about their experiences, and had taped these statements. It later came to light that this evidence had been subsequently destroyed by an FAA official named Kevin Delaney. Press reports in the spring of 2004 confirmed that Delaney had burned the tapes. Was he a mole? The 9/11 commission was not interested in this highly significant and highly indicative matter, and did not bother to include Delaney’s name in its final report. How many other Kevin Delaneys still infest the federal bureaucracy may never be known with precision. But, according to press accounts, federal agency records with possible bearing on 9/11 were “routinely destroyed” between September 11, 2001 and the launching of the 9/11 commission in the spring of 2003. (New York Times, May 6, 2004)
Another FBI whistle-blower was Robert Wright, whose case was taken up by David Schippers, the lawyer who prosecuted the impeachment of Bill Clinton before the House of Representatives, and later by Larry Klayman of Judicial Watch. According to Klayman, Wright had been sounding an alarm within the FBI for years before 9/11 about terrorists within the United States. Rather than act on Wright's warnings, the FBI deflected and obstructed his efforts to curtail dangerous movements by agents of Hamas and Hezbollah. Wright's work within the FBI was geared towards thwarting money- laundering activities by these agents, and after going public he claimed that his efforts were stymied because of an official desire to coddle pro-Palestinian groups to protect the reputation of Yasser Arafat. But Wright’s expertise does not reach up that high; all he knew was what he saw, and the explanations he cites are hearsay or speculation. The important thing is the phenomenon. In the course of Wright’s probing, a Saudi businessman named Yasin Kadi had become implicated in the terrorism funding. Wright was careful to note that, one month after the 9/11 attacks, Kadi was named by the Federal government as a financial supporter of Osama bin Laden. Wright's frustration about the FBI's inaction regarding his warnings led him to write a 500 page manuscript detailing the Bureau's anti-terrorism failings entitled “Fatal Betrayals of the Intelligence Mission.” At a press conference in May, 2002, Wright summed up: “My efforts have always been geared towards neutralizing the terrorist threats that focused on taking the lives of American citizens, in addition to harming the national and economic security of America. However, as a direct result of the incompetence, and at times intentional obstruction of justice by FBI management to prevent me from bringing terrorists to justice, Americans have unknowingly been exposed to potential terrorist attacks for years." He went on to state, "Knowing what I know, I can confidently say that until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are removed from the FBI, I will not feel safe.” (William Rivers Pitt, Truthout, May 31, 2002)
For analytical purposes, we must stress once again that these activities of reputed FBI moles all have to do with the key mole mission of preventing the patsies from being rounded up and put out of action. The patsies, we recall, are not the actual authors of the crime, but their presence as the scapegoats is indispensable to the entire operation. And if the patsies are to operate, their support network, including funding, must operate undisturbed. Ironically, shutting down the patsies tends to shut down the operation, even though the patsies are not part of the operation itself. But they are needed for its propaganda exploitation. The question of the actual authors of the crime will be dealt with shortly.
But is there any hope that things may have gotten better after 9/11. Let us look for a moment at the FBI’s own in-house investigation of what went wrong. According to the Washington Post, the leader of this internal inquiry turns out to have been the official whose most important achievement in his previous career had been the stubborn obstruction of the inquiry into the Waco massacre by former Senator and current US UN Ambassador John Danforth. The FBI official in question was Thomas A. Kelley, the head of the team looking into what the FBI knew and didn't know prior to Sept. 11 for the JICI. Kelley had previously been the deputy general counsel of the FBI. In that capacity he obstructed Danforth’s investigation into the FBI’s role at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco in the spring of 1993. A December 2000 internal FBI memo reported that Kelley “continued to thwart and obstruct” the Waco investigation to the point that Danforth was forced to send a team to search FBI headquarters for the documents he needed. The memo said that Kelley should have been investigated by the Office of Professional Responsibility for “unprofessional conduct, poor judgment, conflict of interest, hostile work environment and retaliation/reprisal” in connection with his role in the Waco investigation. Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA), in a letter to the leaders of JICI, expressed concern about Kelley's presence in the investigation, and noted that Kelley retired from the FBI before an OPR probe could get off the ground. Officials JICI said they were waiting for confidential memos and other documents relating to the allegations against Kelley before deciding how to proceed. Danforth himself, in an interview last year, faulted the FBI's “spirit of resistance” to outside scrutiny. He said getting the information he needed for his investigation “was like pulling teeth.” (Washington Post, June 22, 2002)
In the recent history of terrorism, we have been able to observe situations in which the moles inside the state apparatus and the terrorists in the field have become almost impossible to distinguish. In other words, the moles have gone out into the field in the guise of double agents and infiltrators. One such case involves the shadowy Greek terrorist group, November 19. This group advertises itself as a reaction to the US-backed fascist colonels’ coup in Greece in 1967. More recently, November 19 has inveighed in its communiqués against US imperialism, the capitalist class, the European Community, and Germany, which it has defined as the “Fourth Reich,” a slogan which smacks of the Thatcher-Ridley regime in Britain in 1989-90. It was the November 19 group which in December 1975 claimed responsibility for the assassination of Richard Welch, the CIA station chief in Athens. This crime had been especially useful to the CIA, to its incoming chief, George H.W. Bush, and to the Ford administration in general, who had been on the defensive in intelligence matters for many months because of the aggressive investigations of the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House, which had unearthed much evidence of illegal and questionable activity by the US spy agencies. The Pike Committee had even issued a contempt of Congress citation against none other than Henry Kissinger, the strongman of the Ford regime. Columnists friendly to the CIA impudently blamed the death of Welch directly on the Church and Pike committees, although neither of them had ever mentioned Welch or Athens. (Tarpley 1992 300-301)
Over the years the November 19 organization, while carrying out some 40 armed attacks and assassinations, demonstrated a remarkable ability to escape capture, evading the most carefully prepared traps and ambushes. Gradually the awareness spread that November 19 somehow had access to information from the secret councils of the Greek anti-terror authorities. After four November 19 operatives escaped a police ambush in March 1992, the case broke open to some extent. The boss of the Greek anti-terror unit EKAM, Mihalis Mavroleas, was ousted from his job. It soon became evident that the investigators and the terrorists were in fact the same persons! The Greek Minister for Public Order and the national Chief of Police were obliged to come forward with the extremely embarrassing revelation that November 19 possessed a network of spies within the police. The EKAM, which had been founded in 1990 as the anti-terror corps d’elite, had allegedly been completely penetrated! About half of the anti-terror personnel were fired. But the Athens authorities were clearly doing their best at damage control. As damaging as their revelations were, they were not as damning as the obvious truth, which was that November 19 was in fact a wholly owned subsidiary of the Greek police and intelligence services, perhaps with ties to the CIA and to NATO intelligence. This impression is confirmed by persistent reports of the existence in Greece of a paramilitary formation founded some decades back and supposedly dedicated to the task of organizing guerilla warfare against Soviet occupying forces in case Greece were conquered in the course of a some future war. This unit would thus fit the logic of the stay-behind organization, which has been amply documented in the case of Italy in the case of Gladio, which we describe below. (Wisnewski 1994 395-400)
Something quite similar has been established in regard to the Italian Red Brigades. In 1982 an important official of the Italian Justice Ministry in Rome, Giovanni Senzani, was arrested on the charge of being the head of the Red Brigades in the Naples area. Senzani had been the object of a campaign in the Rome press about the need to discover the identity of “la talpa,” the mole in the state bureaucracy. Senzani was in close relations to SISMI, the Italian military intelligence service, an agency which had been implicated in the Milan bomb of 1969 and other terrorist atrocities. This would indicate that at least part of the Red Brigades structure was directed from inside the government.
The Red Brigades had been created in the late 1960s at the Sociology Department of the University of Trento in northern Italy. The original members had displayed sociopathic symptoms, and they had gradually been eliminated by arrests and shootouts with the police. The Italian investigating judge Ferdinando Imposimato asserted in 1982 that the Red Brigades had been infiltrated by the Israeli Mossad no later than 1978. Based on testimony from two jailed former members of the Red Brigades, Imposimato reported that the Mossad had provided the Italian terrorists with weapons, money, and information. As the original members suffered attrition, they were replaced by new recruits. One of these was Mario Moretti, reputedly the leader of the Red Brigades during the Moro kidnapping. More senior members complained from their jail cells that Moretti failed to pass on warnings of coming police raids, and sabotaged attempted jail breaks. Moretti advocated a policy of constantly escalating violence, and was widely considered an agent provocateur of the CIA.
In these cases, it is not the terrorist organization which has infiltrated the state apparatus, but the state apparatus which finds it convenient to practice a virtual interchangeability with top members of the state apparatus. Sanguinetti notes that, in certain safe houses or lairs of the Red Brigades, there was found “an abundance of ultra-confidential material issuing from police headquarters, central police stations and even from ministries. In view of such eloquent facts, spectacular information [i.e. new broadcasts] always claimed to explain them by emphasizing the ultra-efficient organization of the terrible Red Brigades, and by adding, in order to enhance this wonderful godsend for advertising, the fact that these clandestine militants, so hunted-down but so tentacular, have infiltrated everywhere, even ministries and central police stations.” This, as we will see, is like some 9/11 researchers who conclude that, since the attacks took place on a day when so many special exercises were taking place, Al Qaeda must have infiltrated the Pentagon in order to know exactly when to strike. Naturally Sanguinetti cannot entertain such nonsense. His conclusion: “It is not the Red Brigades who have infiltrated the central police stations and ministries, but agents of the State, issuing from the central police stations and ministries, who have infiltrated the Red Brigades by design, and not only their top leadership, to be sure.” (Sanguinetti 21)
A similar and highly significant case has come to the surface in connection with 9/11. This involves Sibel Edmonds, who worked as a translator for the FBI’s Washington field office. Edmonds’ story may give some the impression that the FBI has been penetrated by some subversive Middle East organization, but a careful reading suggests the reverse. Edmonds became known to the public as a whistle blower protesting very strange activities in her FBI work place. As a result, she was accused of having breached FBI security, and was fired. The heart of Edmonds’s allegation is that the FBI office where she worked was staffed by members of the very same Middle Eastern group whose wiretapped conversations the office was working to translate. The FBI, of course, denied everything. But Edmonds recounts that when she told Dennis Saccher, a special agent in the Washington field office who was conducting the surveillance, about the co-worker's actions, Saccher had replied, "It looks like espionage to me." But Saccher refused to comment for the press. Edmonds was fired in March 2002 after she reported her concerns. Government officials said the FBI fired her because her “disruptiveness” hurt her on-the-job “performance.” Edmonds said she believes she was fired in retaliation for reporting on her co-worker.
Edmonds began working at the FBI in late September 2001. She later reported that she had become particularly alarmed when she discovered that a recently hired FBI translator was going around saying that she belonged to precisely the same Middle Eastern organization whose taped conversations she had been translating for FBI counterintelligence agents. FBI officials did everything that they could to prevent the name of the target group from being revealed to the public, allegedly for national security reasons. This case became public when a Washington Post reporter discovered Edmonds's name in her whistle-blowing letters to federal and congressional officials and approached her for an interview. Edmonds said that on several occasions, her fellow translator had tried to recruit her to join the targeted foreign group. “This person told us she worked for our target organization,” Edmonds said in an interview. “These are the people we are targeting, monitoring.” Of course, what all this means is that the target organization was also controlled by the FBI, or was itself part of the FBI – not that the FBI had been infiltrated.
The other translator was an unidentified 33-year-old U.S. citizen whose native country is home to the target group. This is also the country were Edmonds was born, and is probably Turkey or Iran. Both Edmonds and the other translator are U.S. citizens. The other woman, who is still working under contract for the FBI's Washington field office, refused to comment. Edmonds also reported that the woman and her husband, a U.S. military officer, suggested that Edmonds become a member of their group during a hastily arranged visit to Edmonds's Northern Virginia home on a Sunday morning in December 2001. “He said, ‘Are you a member of the particular organization?’’ Edmonds recalled the woman's husband saying. The military officer went on to add: “It's a very good place to be a member. There are a lot of advantages of being with this organization and doing things together and one of the greatest things about it is you can have an early, unexpected retirement. And you will be totally set if you go to that specific country.” Edmonds also reported that the military officer assured her that she would easily be admitted to the group, especially if she said she worked for the FBI. Later, Edmonds said, the same woman approached her with a list dividing up individuals whose phone lines were being secretly tapped: Under the plan, the woman would translate conversations of her fellow members of the target organization, and Edmonds would handle other phone calls. Edmonds said she refused and that the woman told her that her lack of cooperation could put her family in danger
Edmonds also brought her concerns to her supervisor and other FBI officials in the Washington field office. When no action was taken, she also reported to the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, then to Justice's inspector general. “Investigations are being compromised,” Edmonds wrote to the inspector general's office in March 2002. “Incorrect or misleading translations are being sent to agents in the field. Translations are being blocked and circumvented.” Edmonds had also written to Dale Watson, the bureau's counterterrorism chief. Her case has been referred to Justice's Office of the Inspector General. (Washington Post, June 19, 2002) But in the meantime, the Ashcroft Justice Department has taken the extraordinary step of declaring the Edmonds case a state secret, meaning that literally everything is classified. Sibel Edmonds was interviewed by the 9/11 commission, and makes it into the commission report just once, in footnote 25, page 490, in the course of a discussion about how important it is to have good translators.
But the substance of her case goes completely unreported. This is not surprising, since the entire case has been classified by Ashcroft as a state secret.
After the 9/11 commission had issued its report, Edmonds sent an open letter to Kean and Hamilton pointing out that much of the evidence she had delivered to the commission had simply been ignored. She also escalated her critique by naming the names of FBI supervisors, some of whom qualify for our purposes here as potential moles. Edmonds’ letter provides another rare glimpse at how moles operate inside intelligence agencies to sabotage law enforcement and make sure that patsies are not rounded up or effective warnings given until it is too late.
Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish translator, was hired by the FBI after September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureau's investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson used to work for semi-legit organizations that were the FBI's targets of investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with two individuals who were the FBI's targets of investigation. For months Melek Can Dickerson blocked all-important information related to these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents related to these targets as 'Not Pertinent.' Melek Can Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's investigations and our fight against terrorism. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to certain 9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret Clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the Bureau if this security breach and espionage case was investigated and made public, especially after going through Robert Hanssen's case (FBI spy scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee….
Here we have a serious allegation of serious federal crimes, far worse than Sandy Berger stuffing some old documents into his pants at the National Archives. It also raises the question: is Mike Feghali a conscious, witting mole, or merely an incompetent? Given the chaos inside the FBI, it is sometimes hard to tell. Edmonds also shows that there is no effective discipline or accountability inside the FBI molehill:
Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in charge of FBI personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of translation quality and translation departments' security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising Arabic language units of the FBI's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence investigations.
Edmonds also revealed a specific pre-9/11 warning on patsy activities which was simply ignored by the FBI, and then ignored again by the 9/11 commission:
Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama Bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting 4-5 major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism, Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing 302 forms, and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the Special Agent in Charge, and after 9/11 the agents and the translators were told to ‘keep quiet’ regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to Director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004 stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the Commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing.
Was Frields a mole? This is the kind of question the 9/11 commission should have asked, but which it always ducked. Edmonds goes on to mock the clichés about connecting the dots and sharing intelligence which are the stock in trade of the controlled corporate media. She points out that the Phoenix memo, the Minneapolis alarms, and the Sarshar material all converged in the J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington DC. The FBI had all that it needed to know that a large operation was afoot, which it could have disrupted by rolling up parts of the patsy network. But the FBI did nothing, and the 9/11 commission dropped the ball here as well, as Edmonds stresses:
All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC. Yet, your report claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be gathered as one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why did your report choose to exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant incident not mentioned; despite the public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by refraining from asking him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse during your hearing (Please remember that you ran out of questions during your hearings with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a 'time limit' excuse)?
Mike Feghali appears in Edmonds’ account as a consummate bureaucratic bungler and dissembler. But the question stubbornly arises: was he a mole as well? And what about the bureaucrats who promoted him? Here Feghali is sabotaging translations requested by field agents:
In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an agent from a (city name omitted) field office, re-sent a certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re- translated. This Special Agent, in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rightfully believed that, considering his target of investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and the issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain information that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and re-translated verbatim, the field agent's hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East, through network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information was revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the Special Agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language department. The FBI agent requesting the re-translation never received the accurate translation of that document. (Sibel Edmonds, Letter to Thomas Kean, August 1, 2004)
Before we leave the moles, we must make one further important methodological point. Before the terrorist action occurs, the moles appear as embedded in a government bureaucracy which is resisting the new course which they wish to impose. After the fact, providing that the terrorist action has gone off successfully, the entire government seems to be made up exclusively of moles. Now the moles no longer appear isolated. In fact, the entire government is speaking the language which before the terror attack seemed to be the factional distinction of the moles, to the extent that they said anything. The government bureaucracy can be thought of as a gigantic freight train. With the successful terrorist act, a switch is turned, and the entire train goes rumbling in a new direction. The transformation achieved by a successful act of spectacular terrorism goes beyond what can be achieved by mere directives emanating from the office of the president or some cabinet secretary. Public opinion is shocked and stunned; the Congress is stampeded; the entire bureaucracy senses that the terrorist controllers have proven that it is they who are the strongest. After all, in Byzantine and neocon theory, law is an act of the will of the stronger over the weaker. The neocons regard a successful act of force as a valid act of legislation in that sense. The bureaucracy therefore inclines to the side of the plotters.
Once the new policy has been institutionalized, every bureaucrat will attempt to defend it as a matter of self-preservation. Bureaucratic inertia will now adapt itself to the new party line. This is why, in retrospect, it looks as if the entire government is composed of nothing but moles. But this impression is misleading. It is not feasible for every high government official to be a witting party to the terrorist action. Some, of course, can be given a specific task on a need to know basis, and they may or may not be able to intuit the larger design in which they are a cog. Others need to know everything. But the fully witting participants will number in the hundreds, not the thousands. This is Machiavelli’s most vehement advice in the chapter on conspiracies in The Discourses: keep the number of witting participants as low, limiting it if possible to oneself and at most one other person. In today’s society that would be too few. Of course, after the fact, more officials figure out what is going on, and thus join the ranks of the witting. But it ought to be axiomatic that the entire command structure cannot be in on the secret; what if somebody objects to the planned operation, and has the courage to do something about it? This might become very embarrassing for the plotters. Those who persist in seeing the state apparatus as a whole, of the US command structure as a whole as being behind 9/11 face the problem of what to do about the Phoenix memorandum and the Minneapolis actions, followed by the Rowley whistleblower memo. Here were government officials who were subjectively opposed to the 9/11 operation, even if they were only able to express this opposition in regard to the patsy network with which they were dealing.
